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In Australia significant resources are invested into Regional NRM arrangements 
where some authority and decision-making responsibilities are devolved to Regional 
NRM groups. However, little empirical evidence is available to guide policymakers in 
determining whether investments in such a governance regime will yield optimal 
outcomes. In this paper, we focus on exploring whether the Regional NRM model 
may result in a reduction in net transaction costs by generating social capital. By 
improving levels of trust and cooperation, and minimising levels of conflict between 
various stakeholders involved in NRM activities, costs such as those associated with 
monitoring and compliance can potentially be reduced. Evidence from a survey of 
landholders involved with NRM programs run by the Regional NRM group in the 
Central Queensland region suggests that social capital is generated under the Regional 
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1   Faculty of Business and Informatics, Central Queensland University, Rockhampton, Queensland. Here I learn to do a service to another, without bearing him  
any real kindness; because I foresee, that he will return my service,  
in expectation of another of the same kind, and in order to maintain  
the same correspondence of good offices with me or others.  
And accordingly, after I have served him and he is in possession of the  
advantage arising from my action, he is induced to perform his part,  
as foreseeing the consequences of his refusal 
  
David Hume  
Treatise of Human Nature (1740/1978, p.521)  
 
1. Introduction 
Natural resource governance has been gradually moving away from traditional top-
down, regulatory command and control type policies in the past to more participatory-
type approaches characterised by local level encouragement facilitating the 
emergence of social capital (e.g. Pretty and Smith 2004; Paton et al. 2004; Pretty and 
Ward 2001; Blann et al. 2000; Marshall 1999). In Australia, natural resource 
governance has been gradually moving towards what has become known as Regional 
natural resource management (NRM) with some level of regional community 
responsibility and involvement. 
 
The underlying problem of interest is the inefficient levels of supply of resource 
condition and ecosystem services caused by problems of externalities and public good 
aspects, coupled with information and government failure. In turn, such market 
failures mean individual producers face inappropriate incentives to supply 
environmental services, and significant institutional barriers exist to change the 
current situation. To improve environmental outcomes and address concerns about 
resource condition, governments have been trialling the Regional NRM arrangements 
as well as a range of information, suasion, regulatory and incentive approaches. 
 
From an economic efficiency standpoint, Regional NRM arrangements could be 
viewed as a more strategic investment in regional priorities, representing a shift away 
from inefficient project-based approaches of earlier NRM investment programs such 
as Landcare, which failed to deliver the desired on-ground expectations despite the 
significant investment of funds in this decade-long landmark program (e.g. Marsh 
2001; Woodhill and Nabben 2004). In Queensland, a number of NRM initiatives 
funded under the Natural Heritage Trust (NHT) extension and National Action Plan 
for Salinity and Water Quality (NAP) have been established involving the 
devolvement of some authority and decision-making responsibilities to Regional 
NRM groups.  
 
One outcome has been the conscious decision to invest in the creation of a new 
institutional structure, the regional catchment management or NRM groups. This shift 
to a more participatory, community-based approach to NRM has been largely driven 
by government with little or no economic analysis undertaken to evaluate the regional 
NRM arrangements to date. Little empirical research exists to guide public managers 
in determining best value long term arrangements and strategic investments for 
natural resource governance to achieve environmental outcomes. There is an 
extensive literature that espouses the benefits of adopting bottom-up, participatory 
approaches and the development of social capital enhancing policies which are 
advanced as a means of alleviating transaction costs associated with monitoring and enforcement and other NRM activities (e.g. Pretty 2003; Pretty and Ward 2001; 
Hayami 2001).  
 
Social capital may be a key factor influencing economic welfare, and may be very 
relevant to understanding the level of market failure and provision of environmental 
services. The implementation of new governance arrangements, such as those 
associated with Regional NRM, may be based on elements of social capital. The 
following issues are explored in this paper: (i) How do Regional NRM institutions 
impact on social capital? (ii) How do changes in social capital affect the decisions of 
land managers in relation to conservation activities and the provision of 
environmental services? 
 
In this paper, a theoretical framework for relating the Regional NRM process and 
linkages between potential changes in net transaction costs and social capital are 
presented. Section 2 reviews the current literature on social capital and outlines 
contributing elements of social capital with respect to Regional NRM. Section 3 
discusses how social capital can be examined with respect to changes in economic 
welfare. Section 4 explores how social capital can influence Regional NRM, and 
Section 5 presents some findings from a survey of landholders involved in Regional 
NRM programs in Central Queensland. The paper is closed by some concluding 
remarks in Section 6. 
 
2.   Unravelling the Enigma  
 
2.1  What is Social Capital? 
There are many theories that explain cooperating behaviour in the social sciences.  It 
has been observed that people cooperate more than they should according to standard 
assumptions of individual rationality (e.g. Paldham 2000; Schram 1998). This excess 
cooperation outcome has been confirmed in experiments even for players who do not 
know each other and play only once. This behavioural ‘glue’ generating excess 
cooperation has increasingly been described as ‘social capital’ (Paldham 2000, p.629).  
 
Under the Regional NRM arrangements, community-based Regional NRM groups 
have been formed and granted some decision-making responsibilities relating to 
NRM. A key driver behind this process is founded on the premise that with 
possession of local knowledge on resources and the framework of social and 
economic conditions (O’Riordan and Stoll-Kleeman 2002), communities can work 
together collectively to sustainably manage the environment and natural resources for 
the long term (Uphoff 2002). Social capital encapsulates the idea that social bonds 
and norms are important for communities (Pretty 2003). Therefore, it is important to 
further examine this concept as it may be able to better characterise the dynamics of 
how individuals are able to work cooperatively together to achieve improvements in 
environmental outcomes and influencing economic welfare.  
 
The idea of social capital has been has been applied a range of social and economic 
phenomena, from the growth tragedy of Africa (Easterly and Levine 1997), to the 
flourishing township village enterprises in the People’s Republic of China (Weitzman 
and Xu 1994). The concept underscores the importance of “non-market social 
interactions in socioeconomic outcomes and seeks to fill a lacuna in the traditional 
neoclassical economic framework” (Quibria 2003, p.20). Granovetter (1985) argues that the neoclassical framework represents an inaccurate view of reality since it 
viewed man as anonymous and resistant to any social influence through social 
relations. In reality, individual behaviour is continuously shaped by non-market social 
influences in the form of culture, norms and social structure (Quibria 2003). Social 
interactions matter
2 since they form the basis for social networks, foster trust and 
values, sustain norms and culture, and are the very foundation of community (Quibria 
2003). 
 
A rapidly burgeoning literature explores various definitions and interpretations of the 
concept of social capital (e.g. Paldam 2000; Woolcock and Narayan 2000; Piazza-
Georgi 2002). However, the concept of social capital remains shrouded by vagueness. 
This has led some to dismiss the construct altogether (Fine 2001), and other writers 
insist on more theoretical work to clarify the definition and role of the concept (Sobel 
2002). 
 
The literature on social capital has been characterised by a rapid growth in the 
definition and interpretation of the concept over the last two decades (Bourdieu 1986; 
Coleman 1988; Putnam et al. 1993; Ostrom 1994). However, Fukuyama (1995) and 
Putnam (2000) suggest the notion originates back to 1916 when Lyda Hanifan, a state 
supervisor of rural schools in West Virginia, used the concept to explain the 
importance of community participation in enhancing school performance. According 
to Hanifan (1916, p.130, cited in Sabatini 2006, p.4), social capital referred to:  
 
…tangible substances [that] count for most in the daily lives of people: namely good will, 
fellowship, sympathy, and social intercourse among individuals and families who make up a 
social unit. 
 
The value of the concept was later revived by Jacobs (1961), credited as one of the 
first scholars of modern social capital (Pelling 2003), following her study that 
highlighted mixed-use urban neighborhoods as representing a form of social capital 
which could promote public safety and trust within communities. Around the same 
period in the economics literature, Loury (1977) highlighted the concept in an 
analysis of racial income inequality to describe the social resources of ethnic 
communities, arguing that the neoclassical framework was inadequate because it did 
not incorporate the influences from social networks which can exert a significant 
influence on an individual’s access to opportunities. 
 
In much the same vein, Bourdieu’s (1980) concept of social capital also focused on 
the individual, emphasising the importance of social network as an individual asset 
that affects one’s economic locus in society. Social relations are used to increase the 
ability of an actor to advance economic and social interests from group membership 
and the driver for individual investment in such membership. Hence, Bourdieu 
defines social capital as: 
 
                                                 
2 Therefore, it is perhaps not surprising that research into the concept of social capital has registered an explosive 
development across a multitude of subject areas in the last decade. Isham et al. (2002) note that a “keyword” 
search in all journals in the EconLit economics database shows that citations for “social capital” have grown 
rapidly over the last decade, doubling each year since the late 1990s. The study by Putnam et al. (1993) of Italy 
has been declared as the most cited contribution across the social sciences in the 1990s (Fine 2001, cited in 
Sabatini 2006, p.3).  
 …the sum of the resources, actual or virtual, that accrue to an individual or group by virtue of 
possessing a durable network of more or less institutionalised relationships of mutual 
acquaintance and recognition (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1996, p.119). 
 
To Bourdieu, social capital comprises two components: First, it is a resource that is 
tied to group membership and social networks, and second, a quality produced by the 
totality of the relationships between actors, rather than merely a common attribute of 
the group (Bourdieu 1980). In the 1980s Coleman (1988, 1990) provided a clearer, 
more relevant theoretical framework expressing social capital as the composition of 
relationships between and among individuals that promotes productive activities. 
These aspects of social structure comprise a resource base from which individuals are 
able to tap to realise personal interests. Coleman (1988, p.98) explains: 
 
 Social capital is defined by its function. It is not a single entity, but a variety of different 
entities, with two elements in common: they all consist in some aspect of social structures, and 
they facilitate certain actions of actors within the structure.  
 
Similar to other forms of capital, social capital is productive, making possible the 
achievement of certain ends, which in its absence, would not be possible (Sabatini 
2006). However, unlike other types of capital, Coleman (1988, p.98) asserts that the 
idea “inheres in the structure of relations between and among actors, and not lodged 
either in the actors themselves or in physical implements of production”. Incidentally, 
this is the point of contention raised by economists who are divided about how the 
concept should be treated. 
 
Pelling (2003) notes that although many economists were in agreement that concepts 
such as social capital should form part of economics literature, there was not 
agreement on exactly how it should be considered. Light (2001) remarks that 
economists do not agree on the relationships between (and existence of) different 
types of “capitals”. Becker (1996) declares that the notion of social capital should be 
placed in the same classification as that of human capital. Bates (1998) on the other 
hand, would prefer to acknowledge human capital, but exclude social capital; while 
Hayami (2001) and Bowles and Gintis (2002, p.422) make the argument that social 
capital may not be a form of capital in the truest economic sense and suggest the term 
“community” as more appropriate as it focuses on “what groups do rather than what 
people own”. Following on from this point, Arrow (2000) argues that “capital” infers 
something transferable from one individual to another and it is difficult to transfer 
ownership of social capital.  
 
In summary, social capital is an umbrella term that encompasses the “norms and 
networks facilitating collective actions for mutual benefits” (Woolcock 1998, p 155). 
Although a broad range of views exist in the literature on the notion of social capital, 
ranging from different origins and fields of application, it is apparent that most agree 
on the ability of certain aspects of the social structure to generate positive externalities 
from group membership. This can help individuals to derive a competitive advantage 
in pursuing their ends and can reduce the transaction costs involved in searching, 




 2.2  The Effect on Transaction Costs 
Transaction costs arise from a range of day-to-day activities, including: (i) 
coordination activities among the community members, and (ii) interaction (lobbying, 
bargaining, etc.) between local communities and state agencies (Mburu et al. 2003). 
Transaction costs may differ between households due to household characteristics and 
differences in the willingness of households (or the incentives created for them) to 
bear the transaction costs involved in collective actions of natural resource 
management (Arifin 2006). Earlier studies suggest that transaction costs arising from 
coordination activities are influenced by the social cohesion or the social capital of the 
community members (Ostrom 1994, 2000).  
 
Fukuyama (1995) also highlights the role of social capital in reducing transactions 
costs and increasing economic efficiency. These transactions costs are important in 
daily economic activities such as locating appropriate buyers and sellers, negotiating 
contracts, complying with government regulations, and enforcing contracts in the 
event of dispute or fraud.  
 
In communities with higher stocks of social capital, cooperation requires less explicit 
enforcement and the resources spent on regulation and monitoring are less than in 
those with low stocks of social capital (Greiling 2006). Furobotn and Richter (1999) 
also stress the contribution of trust concerning the aspect of decreasing transaction 
costs. A decrease of transaction costs and mutual gains in cooperative behaviour is the 
central message in Institutional Economics, particularly stressing the extrinsic value 
of trust leading to cost reductions (Kubon-Gilke et al. 2005, cited in Greiling 2006).  
 
Therefore, just as trustworthiness builds trust, so too is social capital credited with 
increasing economic efficiency. Putnam et al. (1993) asserts that a society that relies 
on generalised reciprocity is more efficient than a distrustful society. As social capital 
develops trust, reciprocity, and a common understanding of social norms, it reduces 
the need for preparing formal contracts. It frees resources as individuals are not 
compelled to invest in monitoring others and can trust them to act as expected (Pretty 
and Ward 2001). It can reduce transaction costs by generating expectations that allow 
people to conduct interactions with a degree of certainty.  Societies characterised by 
high levels of trust are also less dependent on formal institutions to enforce 
agreements (Arifin 2006). By reducing transaction costs, trust also promotes 
productive efficiency (Maskell 2000; Offe and Fuchs 2002). 
 
A social environment providing individuals with many opportunities for involvement 
and participation, and allowing people to meet frequently, is a fertile ground for 
nurturing shared values and social norms of trust and reciprocity (Sabatini 2006). The 
improved diffusion of information and the higher opportunity cost of free-riding in 
turn, make peoples’ behaviour more predictable and cause an uncertainty reduction. 
Therefore, an increase in social capital and trust-based relations reduces the average 
cost of transactions, much in the same way an increase in physical capital can reduce 
the average cost of production (Paldam and Svendsen 2000; Routledge and von 




 2.3  Social Capital and NRM 
There is widespread acceptance that environmental and natural resource assets need 
protection from the destructive actions of people (Pretty 2003). This notion lies at the 
core of environmental conservation and NRM. 
 
A possible solution to such dilemmas of NRM is to depend on a third party 
Government Leviathan to compel individuals to act collectively (Olson 1965). A 
second solution is to privatise the problem by assigning property rights to the 
resource, for example, by building fences in common grazing lands as a set of private 
grazing areas. A “third way” (Pretty 2003, p.1913) alternative is to rely on social 
capital, through social norms and sanctioning mechanisms that a group can self-
enforce without the strict regulation of an outside Leviathan (Ostrom 1990). 
Theoretical developments in the governance of the commons and work on the notion 
of social capital has come to shape a great deal on this thinking (Ostrom et al. 2002; 
Singleton 1992), manifesting itself in the Regional NRM arrangements in the 
Australian context and the focus of this paper. 
 
As social capital lowers the transaction costs of working together, it facilitates 
voluntary cooperation. Individuals have the confidence to invest in collective NRM 
activities, knowing that others will also do the same. They are also less likely to 
engage in private actions with negative outcomes, such as resource degradation 
activities (Pretty and Ward 2001; Agrawal 2002). 
 
It was outlined earlier that writers such as Coleman (1988) had defined social capital 
as people’s ability to work voluntarily together. Other writers such as Fukuyama 
(1995) and Dasgupta (1999) credit this ability to cooperate to trust. Trust is often a 
concept intrinsically linked with social capital (e.g. Coleman 1984; Putnam et al. 
1993. Paldham and Svendsen (2000) define social capital as the density of trust, and 
on the micro level, is the mutual expectation  that arises within a community of 
regular, cooperative behavior, based on commonly shared norms. Dasgupta (1988) 
adds that associations reduce opportunistic behaviour by creating repeated interaction 
among individuals, which enhances trust. Fukuyama (1995, p.26) defines the concept 
of trust as: 
 
…the expectation that arises within a community of regular, honest and cooperative behaviour, 
based on commonly shared norms, on the part of that member of the community. Those norms 
can be about deep value questions like the nature of God or justice, but they also encompassed 
secular norms like professional standards and codes of behaviour. 
 
If the people in one’s environment are trustworthy, trust is productive because it 
enables risk-taking in resource exchange and in overcoming dilemmas of collective 
action (Resnick 2000).  
 
3.  Implications for Economic Welfare 
To use the concept of social capital in an economic framework, it is important to 
identify how it is consistent with the concepts of economic welfare. 
 
Welfare economics is concerned with the effect of economic policies on the level of 
welfare of individuals or groups of people. The framework can be used to compare 
the relative merits for two or more situations by assessing the level of welfare in each. 
The welfare of an individual or community can be defined as its well-being. Utility is often used as a synonym, though Price (1977) argued that this has the disadvantage of 
implying (misleadingly) that it arises only from the consumption of ‘useful’ goods. 
Contributing to welfare are a range of conditions which may be defined as 
constituting well-being, such as security, protection from fear, electoral freedom, as 
well as the more obvious economic factors including income and price levels. For the 
issue of natural resource governance, improvements in well-being may be regarded as 
the change in income or satisfaction levels stemming from the desired environmental 
or natural resource condition as a result of a suite of policies or programs.  
 
An important aim of welfare economics is the systematic ordering of alternative social 
states in terms of social welfare, where social welfare is dependent on the welfare of 
individuals in society. A social welfare function (SWF) maps individual utilities into 
an overall social utility function. It is an algebraic formulation that assigns numerical 
social utility to each possible social state, and assumes that individual utility can be 
aggregated to determine overall social welfare with all individuals characterised by 
the same utility function (i.e. equal marginal utility of income for all individuals). 
Ideally, a SWF should be derived from the revealed preferences of the individuals 
concerned, but as Arrow (1951) demonstrated in his Impossibility Theorem, there 
exists no unique method for aggregating individual preferences into social 
preferences. The concept of the SWF originates from Bergson (1938). The original 
Bergson welfare function was designed to rank not the combination of individual 
welfare but more directly, the combinations of all those variables on which the 
individual welfare depends. In particular, it includes the goods consumed and the 
services rendered by each of the individuals in the society. 
 
The utilitarian social welfare function can be expressed below as: 
 
W(U) =  Σi Ui
 
Welfare (W) is given as a function of the sum of all individual utilities (U) in society. 
Individual utilities can be expressed as a function of various factors, commonly 
including level of income, and other factors such as environmental condition, and 
assets. In this case, maximising the social welfare function means maximising the 
total income of the members of the society, without regard to how incomes are 
distributed. In practice the concept of the SWF emerges in the consideration of 
distributional implications of alternative policy scenarios. 
 
In the context of natural resource governance, a key task is to evaluate whether 
changes in environmental conditions are worthwhile to society. In economics, we 
assess this by estimating the net welfare changes associated with a particular proposal 
(this provides the theoretical base for cost-benefit analysis). In assessing the net 
welfare change, we have to consider both the benefits and the costs involved. 
Differing levels of social capital can be important in several ways to influence these 
positive and negative impacts – including those on income or willingness to pay.  
 
Social capital is postulated as a key factor influencing economic welfare. Table 1 





Approach     Relationship 
1. Production function      Social capital is a factor of production 
2. Transaction costs      Transactions are easier in the presence of trust 
3. Monitoring costs      Social capital allows cheap self-monitoring 
(Source: Paldam 2000, p.636) 
 
Each of these relationships outlined in Table 1 may be important in producing NRM 
outcomes. The development of networks of trust and shared vision for environmental 
outcomes through the institution of Regional NRM could potentially facilitate the 
emergence of self-monitoring processes. Increasing levels of social capital can reduce 
net transaction costs and therefore contribute to economic welfare. It can be viewed as 
a factor that can reduce the costs of monitoring and compliance associated with the 
promotion of improved land management activities, such as through the Regional 
NRM process. 
 
The Regional NRM arrangements of interest in this paper can therefore be viewed as 
a vehicle to foster the development of social capital, which in turn, can produce 
benefits in two main ways: (i) by reducing transaction costs and (ii) generating 
improved environmental and NRM outcomes. 
 
4.  How is the institution of Regional NRM affected by the existence of social 
capital? 
 
As outlined earlier, Regional NRM arrangements are acknowledged as a more 
strategic investment in NRM priorities than the project-based programs such as 
Landcare. Regional NRM is characterised by a shift to more participatory, 
community-based approaches that tap in to local knowledge in preparing and 
implementing NRM programs, thereby reducing conflict between the community and 
government and fostering the development of social capital.  
 
Regional NRM promotes the development of local institutions. These may be 
effective because they permit individuals to undertake daily exchanges and activities 
with a minimum of repetition and costly negotiation (Bromley 1993). Pretty and Ward 
(2001) assert that social capital lowers these costs of working together and facilitates 
cooperation. Hence, this results in individuals within a society possessing the 
necessary confidence to invest in collective activities, assured that others will also do 
the same. They are also less likely to engage in rent-seeking actions that result in 
negative impacts such as resource degradation.  
 
There is little evidence available to suggest that the Regional NRM model has 
generated increased efficiencies in NRM due to the difficulty in identifying and 
measuring all the transaction costs and related benefits. While regional NRM groups 
such as the Fitzroy Basin Association (FBA) in Central Queensland, the subject of 
study in this research, will deliver a number of outcomes, these are largely driven by 
the allocation of government funding, and it is unclear if the allocation of the same 
funds through different processes would deliver inferior outcomes. The key analytical 
issue is whether the Regional NRM model can generate more benefits compared to 
other models. In this research, six key elements of the Regional NRM process that may generate social capital and improved NRM outcomes was identified. These 
include: 
1.  Tailoring NRM plans to local and regional knowledge 
2.  Capacity building 
3.  Improving cooperative behaviour 
4.  Changing behaviour through improved knowledge 
5.  Improved take-up and compliance 
6.  Reduced conflict over resource management 
 
In this research, the assessment of the Regional NRM model will focus on examining 
the level of transaction costs of involvement in Regional NRM programs and 
examining the elements contributing to social capital development. 
The role and choice of institutions will have different cost implications and 
transaction cost profiles. The question is whether it is worth investing in a regional 
model to create social capital as opposed to managing service delivery centrally 
through established government infrastructure which is likely to involve lower 
opportunity costs, but with potentially lower levels of social capital creation. 
 
5.  Assessment of a Regional NRM model – The FBA case study 
A key focus of this research is to determine if elements of social capital seem to be 
important in a Regional NRM model. As part of the assessment of a Regional NRM 
model in light of the six elements identified in Section 4, a survey of landholders 
involved in NRM programs of the FBA Regional NRM group in Central Queensland 
focused on identifying whether these benefits were likely to exist under this 
institutional framework.  
 
The survey sought to test whether institutional mechanisms such regional governance 
arrangements for NRM, may be influenced by a number of elements contributing to 
social capital. In addition, the survey also sought to identify the level of transaction 
costs associated with landholder involvement in Regional NRM programs.   
Data was collected by a telephone survey conducted by the Population Research 
Laboratory at Central Queensland University. The final sample included 67 
landholders who participated in the FBA’s Neighbourhood Catchments Devolved 
Grants Program
3. Landholders were asked to assess various aspects of their 
involvement with the program with the objective of collecting information from 
participants which could be used to improve future funding rounds of the program. 
Reviewing a particular program run by the FBA provides a microcosm of this 
governance arrangement and is able to provide a useful analysis of this model in the 
context of delivering NRM services.  
The following key tests are reported in this section: 
•  Level of transaction costs associated with participation in a regional body 
incentives program. 
                                                 
3  The FBA Devolved Grants program provided seed funding incentives to encourage landholders to 
adopt improved land management practices in the region. •  Elements associated with the generation of social capital, which will be 
assessed under the following categories: 
o  Change in levels of conflict between landholders and the government; 
o  Change in levels of adoption and take-up for environmental programs; 
o  Level of flexibility compared with centrally run government programs; 
o  Ability of NRM actions to be tailored to local knowledge; 
o  Potential for achieving NRM and environmental outcomes; and 
o  Change in level of production. 
In assessing the transaction costs, respondents were asked to provide an estimation of 
both the total time and costs involved with participating in the FBA program. 
Landholders were also asked to estimate what area of their property was taken out of 
production, and whether they experienced a change to their net farm income as a 
result of their involvement in the program.  
 
5.1 Survey  Results 
The total cost of individual landholder involvement in the program amounted to 
approximately $34,392. This was calculated by summing the total direct costs of 
purchasing materials and labour for the program, together with the total number of 
hours invested by landholders in various aspects of the NRM program (e.g. 
construction, maintenance, and application process). The number of hours invested 
was converted to a dollar figure by multiplying this with the average wage rate. Table 
2 summarises the total costs associated with landholder involvement in the NRM 
program.  
 
Table 2:  Cost of Participation in FBA Program 
 
Question Units  No.  of 
responses 
Mean  
Was time involved in 
construction?  Hours 58 412  $6,308* 
Was time involved in 
subsequent management 
and/or maintenance?  
Hours 58  40  $612* 
Was time involved in applying 
for, or organising the incentive 
grant with the FBA?  
Hours 58  15  $234* 
In dollars only, approximately 
how much money was used to 
purchase materials/labour?  
$ 58  26,443  $26,443 
What was the area of land 
taken out of production?   Hectares 58  98 $792** 
In dollars only, what was the 
change in net farm income?   $ 56  2,643   
Total       $34,391.00 
*   Calculation based on Queensland average annual wage of $31,844 for 2000-01 (ABS 2001) 
** Calculation based on mean per hectare farm income 
 While the costs presented are classified as direct costs to landholders, they can also be 
viewed as the value of additional contributions that have been generated as a result of 
increased engagement and social-capital-enhancing processes under this regional 
governance arrangement. This compares to an average grant payment of 
approximately $10,000 to landholders involved in the program (FBA 2006). In effect, 
this shows that on average, this grant was able to leverage landholders to undertake 
NRM cost-sharing activities to the factor of approximately 3.4 times the grant 
amount. 
 
The survey also revealed that participation in NRM activities associated with the 
grants program resulted in, on average, 98 hectares of land taken out of production per 
farm. This was equivalent to an average value of lost production of $793 per farm. 
However, the majority of landholders involved in the program reported a net increase 
in farm income of $2,643 per farm. Hence, the findings from this case study add 
support to the notion that Regional NRM processes can make a net contribution to 
economic welfare. 
 
The assessment of the indirect benefits generated under the Regional NRM model was 
also undertaken by examining landholder involvement in the program. To achieve 
this, the survey asked respondents how they viewed the administration of the program 
under the Regional Body model. The findings revealed that the majority of involved 
landholders thought that the FBA program had: 
•  led to reduced conflict between landholders and the government; 
•  led to improved levels of adoption and take-up for environmental programs; 
•  was more flexible than government programs; 
•  allowed NRM actions to be tailored to local knowledge; 
•  improved the likelihood of achieving NRM and environmental outcomes; and 
•  helped farmers to improve their production. 
 



















Table 3:  Views on the Benefits and Impacts of the FBA Program 
Question  These types of programs …  No.  of 
responses  Mean Std.  Dev. 
29a  …will lead to reduced levels of conflict 
between landholders and the government. 
64 3.53*  1.266 
29b  …will lead to improved levels of adoption 
and take-up for environmental programs. 
64 4.08*  1.029 
29c  …will lead to more flexibility than 
government programs in dealing with 
environmental conservation issues. 
64 4.02*  1.165 
29d  …will allow Natural Resource Management 
actions and programs to be tailored to local 
knowledge. 
64 4.19*  1.080 
29e  …will improve the likelihood of achieving 
environmental outcomes. 
64 4.25*  1.031 
29f  …will help landholders improve 
production. 
64 4.09*  1.052 
 
























29f  29b  29a 29c 29d 29e
Disagree Neither disagree nor agree
 








 6. Conclusion 
From a neoclassical economic framework there appears to be little reason why 
Regional NRM groups such as the FBA should exist. They appear to be an additional 
layer of institutional bureaucracy, perform similar functions to government, and may 
just duplicate a lot of NRM service delivery functions. There would appear to be a 
strong case for just using government to engage with landholders and use a mix of 
suasion, regulatory and incentive mechanisms to improve NRM outcomes. 
The research reported in this paper explored three main issues: 
•  Concepts of social capital which explain why Regional NRM models generate 
benefits; 
•  How the benefits arising from social capital can be incorporated into a social 
welfare function; and 
•  How social capital can generate net economic benefits in a case study setting. 
In this paper a number of contributing elements have been identified. A survey of 
landholders involved with the FBA Regional NRM group in Central Queensland 
suggests these elements are important, and could contribute to economic welfare 
through lowering net transaction costs.  
Social capital may be a key factor in influencing economic welfare, and may be very 
relevant to understanding the level of market failure and provision of environmental 
services. The use of institutional mechanisms such as the Regional NRM 
arrangements for improved environmental outcomes may be based on elements of 
social capital. 
The overall case for using a Regional NRM model has not yet been evaluated, but 
there is a strong conclusion that a social capital framework should be used. Hence, an 
evaluation of Regional NRM arrangements should explicitly account for elements of 
and impact on, social capital. References 
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